

In your confirmation statement you may wish to address the problem of the DCI's relationship to CIA. Not only are such organizational questions a current subject of public discussion, but they are directly relevant to the recent flap on strategic National Intelligence Estimates.

In his role as the President's chief intelligence advisor, the DCI must be prepared to give the President objective substantive assessments. This means that he must be able to take positions independent of departmental ones when he deems it necessary, a requirement that in turn demands that he have independent analytic resources to assist him in evaluating departmental views. Such a capability has become increasingly important as intelligence has become more sophisticated and more dependent on complex technical analysis. It was to meet these demands that ^{some of} CIA's analytic organizations were formed, and the "DCI's position," i.e., the governing judgment in NIEs, has taken form through full discussion between him and these organizations. This dialogue has served to coalesce the positions of the DCI and CIA; as a result, CIA has rarely taken a dissent.

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Through the 1975 estimate in the NIE 11-3/8 series (Soviet Forces for Intercontinental Warfare) the DCI's position on Soviet strategic objectives was adhered to by State, DIA, Army, and Navy, thus representing a consensus.

In 1976, however, the DCI (and CIA) ^{estimated} this question. State took a slightly "softer"

view than the DCI. More importantly, DIA, Army, and Navy moved to a view that the USSR was indeed seeking strategic superiority in a programmed fashion. (Air Force has traditionally taken an extreme view.) In effect, the DCI now has to adjudicate a civilian-military argument. His dilemma is that he needs CIA to support his substantive independence, but the more he identified^S with CIA, the less objective he appears in DoD.

This is only one of the complexities of the DCI-CIA relationship. Ultimately, the President with your advice will have to decide what that relationship should be. For the purposes of confirmation, we would suggest that you not commit yourself to a definitive view. Certainly a statement by you that you see CIA as simply one of a group of contending intelligence agencies would challenge its reason for being and would have serious effect on its morale. For this reason we recommend that you make clear that the DCI needs substantive support from other than departmental sources.

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TRANSMITTAL SLIP		DATE
		4 Feb 77
TO: 		
ROOM NO.	BUILDING	
7D60	Hqs.	
REMARKS:		
<p>Mr. Falkiewicz plans to use paragraphs 2 and 4 of the attached. If you have any questions, please call Mr. Falkiewicz directly.</p>		
FROM: Richard Lehman, D/DCI/NI		
ROOM NO.	BUILDING	EXTENSION
7E62	Hqs.	

FORM NO. 241
1 FEB 55REPLACES FORM 36-8
WHICH MAY BE USED.

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